

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION**

Joel Dobbins,)	
)	
Plaintiff(s),)	Civil Action File No.:
)	
v.)	
)	
Hunter Warfield,)	COMPLAINT WITH
)	<u>JURY TRIAL DEMAND</u>
Defendant.)	
)	

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This action for damages is based upon the Defendant's overt and intentional, unlawful conduct in the furtherance of its efforts to collect a consumer debt. The Defendant's conduct is in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 *et seq.* and for violations of the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act (GFBPA), O.C.G.A. 10-1-390 *et seq.*

PARTIES

1. Plaintiff, Joel Dobbins, is a natural person who resides in Fulton County, Georgia.
2. Defendant, Hunter Warfield, is a corporation formed under the laws of the State of Florida and does business in Georgia. Defendant may be served with

process via its registered agent, Stephen Sloboda, at 4620 Woodland Corporate Boulevard, Tampa, Florida 33614-2415.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This Court has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 *et seq.*, claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1337.

4. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because, *inter alia*, Defendants frequently and routinely conducts business in the State of Georgia, including the conduct complained of herein.

5. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, venue is proper in the Northern District of Georgia because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in this district.

6. Pursuant to LR 3.1B(3), venue is proper in Atlanta Division because the Plaintiff resides in Fulton County which is in the Atlanta Division.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

7. Plaintiff is a man with deteriorating health. He is disabled, unable to engage in competitive employment, and is in the process of obtaining disability insurance benefits through the Social Security Administration.

8. Plaintiff is allegedly obligated to pay a consumer debt arising out of an apartment rental and is therefore, a “consumer”, as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3).

9. Defendant is a collection agency specializing in the collection of consumer debt.

10. Defendant uses interstate commerce and/or mail in its business in the collection of consumer debts.

11. Defendant manages, and collects upon, thousands of consumer debt accounts annually.

12. Defendant is, therefore, a “debt collector” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

13. As a result of Plaintiff’s disability and inability to engage in regular employment, he has become delinquent on a number of accounts.

14. As part of an ongoing effort to get his financial affairs in order, the Plaintiff obtained a copy of his credit report as published by Transunion, Experian, and Equifax.

15. Credit reporting is recognized as a powerful tool used to extract payment from consumer debtors. *Quale v. Unifund CCR Partners*, 682 F.Supp.2d 1274 (S.D. Ala. 2010)

16. In reviewing his credit files, Plaintiff noted that Defendant had reported an account under collection.

17. The Plaintiff did not recognize the accounts or was unfamiliar with information being reported by the Defendant.

18. On or about January of 2020, Plaintiff initiated a call to Defendant to obtain more information.

19. During the course of the call, Defendant encouraged the Plaintiff to begin partial monthly payments agreeing that they would be applied to the accounts in collection.

20. During the course of the call, Plaintiff specifically asked if beginning regular partial payments to be applied to the debt under collection carried any negative effects for the Plaintiff. The Defendant responded in the negative.

21. The account reported by the Defendant and in collection is a contract debt for and thus subject to a statute of limitations of six years per O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24.

22. If Plaintiff made a partial payment, it would restart the statute of limitations on the debt which would be a negative effect for the Plaintiff.

23. Defendant made misrepresentations to Plaintiff about the potential negative effects of making a partial payment on the debt.

INJURIES-IN-FACT

24. The FDCPA provides consumers with “statutorily-created rights to be free from ‘being subjected to false, deceptive, unfair, or unconscionable means to collect a debt.’” *McCamis v. Servis One, Inc.*, No. 8:16-CV-1130-T-30AEP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99492 (M.D. Fla. July 29, 2016); *Church v. Accretive Health, Inc.*, 654 Fed. Appx. 990, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12414, 2016 WL 3611543 (11th Cir. 2016).

25. An injury-in-fact sufficient to satisfy Article III standing requirements “may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.” *Church*, at 993, quoting *Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman*, 455 U.S. 363, 373, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 71 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1982).

26. Violation of statutory rights are not a “hypothetical or uncertain” injury, but one “that Congress has elevated to the status of a legally cognizable injury through the FDCPA.” *McCamis*, at 4, citing *Church*, at 3.

27. Defendant is subjecting Plaintiff to false, deceptive, unfair, and unconscionable means to collect the debt.

28. Accordingly, through the violation of Plaintiffs’ statutorily created rights under the FDCPA, Plaintiffs have suffered an injury-in-fact sufficient to establish Article III standing.

DAMAGES

29. As a result of the Defendant's actions and/or omissions, Plaintiff has suffered actual damages, including but not limited to the following:

- a.) Being subjected to false, deceptive, unfair, and unconscionable debt collection practices;
- b.) Uncompensated time expended away from work and/or activities of daily living, to confer with counsel regarding the Defendant's collection efforts; and,
- c.) Anxiety and worry due to collection efforts

CAUSE OF ACTION

VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

15 U.S.C. § 1692 *et seq.*

30. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 29 as though fully stated herein.

Violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e and its subparts

31. 15 U.S.C. §•1692e specifically prohibits the use of any false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt.

32. The use of “or” in § 1692e means a representation violates the FDCPA if it is false or deceptive or misleading. *Bourff v. Rubin Lublin, LLC*, 674 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2012).

33. The standard in determining the nature of any such representation is that of the “least sophisticated consumer.” Its purpose is to protect “naive consumers” with a minimal understanding of personal finance and debt collection. *LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners*, 601 F.3d 1185, 1194 (11th Cir. 2010).

34. Moreover, the least sophisticated consumer is not to be held to the same standard as a reasonably prudent consumer. The least sophisticated consumer, though not unreasonable, is “ignorant” and “unthinking,” “gullible,” and of “below-average sophistication or intelligence,” *Pinson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass'n*, No. 16-17107, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 33662, at 12-13 (11th Cir. Nov. 12, 2019), quoting *Clomon v. Jackson*, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993)

35. A false representation in connection with the collection of a debt is sufficient to violate the FDCPA, even if it is not alleged or proven to be misleading or deceptive.

36. Defendant’s representations that the Plaintiff could begin to make regular, partial payments to be applied to the debt in collection without negative consequence or effect was objectively false and or materially misleading in that such

payments in conjunction with such an agreement would restart the applicable, and expired, statute of limitations. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-112; 9-3-110; *SKC, Inc. v. eMag Solutions*, 326 Ga. App. 798, 801-802 (1) (755 SE2d 298) (2014).

37. Defendant's representations were a violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2) and e(10). *See, Lopera v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc.*, 2016 WL 6650744 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2016) (denying dismissal of §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(10), and 1692f claims based on letter offering to "resolve your unpaid" debt through payment plan, without disclosing that statute of limitations could be revived by partial payment or agreement to pay).

38. As a result of Defendant's violations of the FDCPA, Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs for actual damages as described herein, statutory damages in the amount of \$1,000.00, costs of this action and reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the Court as mandated by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.

COUNT II

VIOLATIONS OF THE GEORGIA FAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES ACT

O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390, *et seq.*

39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 38 as though fully stated herein.

40. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 *et seq.* is commonly known as the "Fair Business Practices Act of 1975" (the "GFBPA").

41. The purpose of the GFBPA, is to protect consumers from unfair and/or deceptive practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce in part or wholly in the state. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-391.

42. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-391 directs that the GFPBA is to be interpreted and applied liberally and in harmony with the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), which implements the FDCPA.

43. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-393(a) of the GFBPA broadly prohibits unfair and/or deceptive business practices.

44. Defendant intentionally engaged in unfair and deceptive business practices, as set forth herein, in an effort to collect a consumer debt.

45. Defendant's conduct has implications for the consuming public in general.

46. Defendant's conduct negatively impacts the consumer marketplace.

47. Collecting a debt incurred during a consumer transaction could harm the general consuming public if conducted via deceptive acts or practices and clearly falls within the parameters of the GFBPA. Thus, a violation of the FDCPA

constitutes a violation of the GFBPA. *See 1st Nationwide Collection Agency, Inc. v. Werner*, 288 Ga. App. 457, 459 (2007).

48. Upon information and belief, Defendant does not maintain a place of business in Georgia and has no assets in Georgia, thus relieving Plaintiffs of the Notice and Demand requirements of O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399(b).

49. As a result of Defendant's violations of O.C.G.A. § 10-1-393(a), Plaintiff is entitled to recover general damages pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399(a).

50. As a result of Defendant's intentional violations of O.C.G.A. § 10-1-393(a), Plaintiff is entitled to recover exemplary damages pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399(a).

51. As a result of Defendant's intentional violations of O.C.G.A. § 10-1-393(a), Plaintiff is entitled to recover treble damages pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399(c).

52. Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and expenses of litigation pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399(d).

TRIAL BY JURY

53. Plaintiff is entitled to and hereby requests a trial by jury.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that judgment be entered against Defendant for:

- a.) Plaintiff's actual damages;
- b.) Statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k;
- c.) Reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k
- d.) General, exemplary, and treble damages pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399(a) & (c);
- e.) Reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399(d); and
- f.) Such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 17th day of March, 2020.

BERRY & ASSOCIATES

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